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 This paper attempts to contribute to the sociological literature on terrorism by 
testing Friedrich Nietzsche's (1967) ideas about the relationship between inequality and 
terrorism. Nietzsche's work predicts that political and economic inequality are positively 
related to ressentiment, a hatred of the elites in society. Ressentiment, in turn, is 
positively related to political violence, one form of which is terrorism. Working from 
Nietzsche's writing and a body of literature that examines the connection between 
terrorism and regime type, it is also predicted that these relationships will be stronger in 
liberal democracies than any other regime type. Using country-level data, the findings 
reveal that none of the predicted relationships hold true for other regime types. However, 
liberal democracies do exhibit the expected positive relationship between economic 
inequality and ressentiment. Implications the findings have for Nietzsche's theory and 
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 This paper draws on Friedrich Nietzsche's ideas on the consequences of inequality 
and ressentiment to develop and test a theory of sources of terrorism. According to 
Nietzsche, inequality in social status and material resources leads to feelings of 
ressentiment among those who are disadvantaged by the status quo. Ressentiment is a 
hatred of and desire to punish the elite, which, if gone unchecked, can spark political 
violence. The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, it opens the door to empirically 
testing the validity of Nietzsche's work and approaching it from a sociological point of 
view.  His writings have been largely ignored by the discipline. Some sociologists argue 
that Nietzsche is a potentially important social theorist that can and should be brought 
more prominently into the field (see Antonio 1995 for a discussion of sociologists who 
have argued that Nietzsche has something important to contribute to sociology as well as 
the ways he has influenced the discipline indirectly). Second, by examining a specific 
kind of political violence, terrorism, this paper seeks to add to the literature concerning 
the link, or lack there of, between different dimensions of inequality and terrorism.   
    
Theory 
 
In The Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche (1967) outlines the process by which the 
structure of a society gives rise to ressentiment. He conceptualizes human nature as being 
innately power-seeking, and he calls this fundamental drive the will to power, the force 
behind all human action. J.P. Stern (1979) identifies the will to power as “a self or „a 
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center of power‟ that expands beyond its own boundaries, asserts itself over another and 
strives to appropriate it” (118).  
Many European philosophers believed that the time before human beings created 
societies represented chaos and brutality, as all people were at the mercy of whoever was 
stronger than they were. The invention of society represented an escape from this state of 
barbarism. Thomas Hobbes (1982), for example, characterized pre-social humans as 
being chaotic, violent, and condemned to short and fearful lives due to an absence of any 
greater force that might keep the strong from fighting amongst themselves and preying on 
the weak. The only way to escape this state of permanent infighting was to build a society 
that was guided by the absolute authority of a single sovereign. Without such a sovereign, 
society would inevitably break down and the population would be thrust back into that 
pre-social state of turmoil. Since society was preferable to a lack of society, Hobbes 
decried any attempt to overthrow or any action that might undercut the authority of the 
sovereign ruler. John Stuart Mill (1989) held an evolutionary view of human social 
arrangements. Based on how complex a society was, it could be categorized as being 
higher or lower on a scale of human progress, and a society‟s placement on this scale was 
indicative of its overall moral state. European societies represented the current pinnacle 
of human progress. As such, they represented the highest state of rationality and morality.  
The people living in less advanced societies were closer to nature and less civilized. 
European observers believed that people from primitive societies possessed less 
intelligence and were less rational and moral. Their social customs were barbaric as a 
result of not having these traits.  
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In contrast, Nietzsche (1967) held that society was not an escape from domination 
by the strongest, but the product of domination and the inevitable outcome of a power-
seeking human nature. Pre-social humans became social humans with the emergence of 
some people who exemplified the will to power. They had both the desire and ability to 
dominate others and could force them to bend to their will.  
These founders of society, identified as the elites or aristocrats, sought to preserve 
their advantage by building a system that was most beneficial for themselves. They 
achieved this through both physical and ideological domination. These two aspects of 
dominance are deeply intertwined, as the ability to inflict violence on others buffered the 
claim to superior social status and high social position legitimized the use of force. For 
Nietzsche, society put constraints on people that ran contrary to their primal nature, and 
the only way human beings could be compatible with a social order, particularly that of 
the modern nation-state, was for their behavior to be remolded through continuous acts of 
violence from the elite. The elites gained power, wealth, and a claim to greater social 
status. Ironically, however, by building a society they imposed constraints upon 
themselves, although to a lesser degree than the commoners faced. Commoners were 
constrained by the legal, political, and economic systems that benefited elites, whereas 
the elites were constrained by the contact with other people who embodied the free 
exercise of the will to power. This created a balance of power among the elites of a 
society, where the desire to gain more power was present but thwarted by the presence of 
others with similar desires.  
After imposing physical domination, the elites established ideological dominance. 
Nietzsche believed that the moral systems that upheld social order were not objective 
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entities but products of class position. In his conceptualization of society, there are only 
two classes: a relatively small and culturally distinct class that dominates other members 
of society while it holds the lion's share of power and resources and an oppressed class 
that constitutes the majority. The elites were in a position to determine what was good or 
bad, and they decided to cast their class as innately good. They labeled the traits that they 
believed they embodied and gave them the right to rule as virtues. In contrast, since 
commoners lacked these fundamental traits, the elite held them in contempt. Their power 
allowed them to impose their moral system on the whole of society.  
Thus, cementing inequality in terms of power, resources, and social status 
accompanies the creation of society. However, the subjugated did not like being at the 
mercy of elite violence and relegated to a subordinate social rank. In response to the 
abuses of their oppressors, the commoners developed ressentiment, or a hatred, toward 
the elite.
1
 According to Nietzsche, it was only after humans created a civilization that 
ressentiment could arise.   
Once subjugated people bring it into being, ressentiment enables them to 
challenge the morality of the elites, and, by extension, the inequalities of society by 
creating an alternative system of moral evaluation. However, rather than representing a 
complete break with the prevailing morality, the new moral system is an inversion of the 
                                                 
 
1
 There are some noticeable similarities between Nietzsche's writings about the development of 
ressentiment and Karl Marx's theory of class conflict. Both philosophers theorize that political violence 
against the elite was a possible outcome when subordinated social groups begin to think that the dominant 
group is acting unjustly against them.  For Marx (2008), class and class structure is an economic 
designation. Which class each person falls into and which class is dominant is based on what productive 
resources they control. Political and social power stem from economic power, and elites use power to 
further their control over society's economic resources. However, Nietzsche's conception of class is based 
around Max Weber's (2008) definition of power, which is "the chance of a man or a number of men to 
realize their own will in a communal action even against the resistance of others who are participating in 
the action" (114). The defining hallmark of the elite class was a skill for commanding power, and their 
political, social, and economic advantages ultimately stemmed from their knack for exercising it. 
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old. It redefines the virtues of elite morality as vices and the vices of the commoners as 
virtues. Nietzsche calls this the slave revolt of morality, as it arms the oppressed with 
ideological weapons that they can use against the elites. By labeling their oppressors as 
evil, the masses have tools to contest the elites‟ right to power and special privileges. 
Should the moral system of the lower classes overpower that of the elites and become 
dominant, it justifies the suppression and punishment of the elite.  
Nietzsche is rather ambiguous about what form of punishment the lower classes 
seek to inflict on the elite. At one point, he says that ressentiment represents an 
“imaginary revenge,” as it allows those that lack power to strike back at their oppressors 
without taking real action (Nietzsche 1967: 36). He holds up the Christian idea of 
damnation as an example of this phenomenon, as it can allow people who have been 
mistreated to imagine that God will punish their tormentor for them. He also uses the rise 
in social prominence of Christianity during the end of the Roman Empire and the 
subsequent decline of the pagan moral philosophy of the Greeks and Romans as a major 
cultural force as an example of a successful slave revolt in morality. Since ressentiment is 
characterized in this instance as being passive, eschewing power on surface level, the 
punishment of the elite is relegated to the ideological realm
2
. By vilifying the elite and 
their power seeking ways, the worst that people motivated by ressentiment could do to 
powerful individuals is shame them into complying with the morality of the lower 
                                                 
 
2
 Karl Marx had a similar view of religion and may have influenced Nietzsche's views. For Marx, 
human beings created religion in order to cope with the suffering they experienced. He believed that 
religion would cease to exist once suffering was relieved. However, religion could only offer solace rather 
than a solution to suffering as it also promoted the idea that people should accept the status quo rather than 
try to change it (Marx 2002).  This implies that Marx felt that passivity stemmed from a sincere belief that 
the world was as it was because of some greater entity. Nietzsche, however, felt that in the modern world 
few people held a sincere belief in the god of Christianity (Antonio 1995). It is possible that ressentiment 
becomes an active force after this point, as people try to stand in for God since they can longer be certain 
that there is an entity that will mete out divine punishment.     
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classes. Elite advantage falls, not because of violent overthrow, but because it becomes 
incompatible with the dominant view of what constitutes a just society.  
If one is to accept the Christianization of Rome as an example of successful social 
revolution spurred on by ressentiment, the facts of this historical event contradict the idea 
that early Christians were content to leave revenge to God. To consolidate power, early 
Church leaders used violence against rivals to political power both from outside and 
inside the Christian community. Rather than being passive, the early Christian Church 
was aggressive in establishing political and cultural dominance (Collins 1974; 
MacMullen 1997). 
Other events and philosophies that Nietzsche identifies as examples of 
ressentiment also clearly conflict with the idea that the social change spurred by 
ressentiment is the result of bloodless revolution. He holds up the French revolution, the 
Protestant Reformation, socialism, anarchism, and anti-Semitism as modern 
manifestations of ressentiment. There was an anti-elite ideological component to these 
political movements, as each one represents a backlash against the dominance of some 
group, although in the case of anti-Semitism this is an imagined dominance. However, 
these movements were not merely ideological rebellions. Rather, the French Revolution 
and the Protestant Reformation were accompanied by political violence, as alternative 
ideas that stood in opposition to the status quo were used to justify physical rebellion 
against reigning elites. Public executions of the aristocracy during the French Revolution 
provides a well known example ressentiment leading to the violent overthrow of an elite 
group that had been perceived as the cause of suffering among the lower classes. It is 
more difficult to paint entire ideological movements as inherently violent since different 
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adherents may have vastly different ideas about what tactics of resistance are morally 
permissible, but the political philosophies that Nietzsche describes as rooted in 
ressentiment have been used in the past to justify episodes of violence. 
Sheila Fitzpatrick (2001), in her work on the Russian Revolution, concurs with 
the idea that violence is an outcome of ressentiment, as it must always precede 
revolutions. In discussing ressentiment as a social phenomenon, she states that during a 
revolution, the perception of who is an elite may shift over time, as when revolutionary 
leaders fill the social void left over from the defeat of the previous elite. Also, the elite 
may not be one group that dominates the whole of society. Rather the elite may consist of 
several distinct groups whose power only extends over a limited sphere of social life. 
Therefore, once a grievance has been avenged against one elite group, attention may shift 
to a different elite and the perceived injustice that they are responsible for.  
 However, revolutions are fairly uncommon in human history, indicating that, 
while ressentiment may be a pre-condition for anti-elite violence, it may not immediately 
express itself as overt rebellion. James Scott (1985) suggests that violent rebellion may be 
a last ditch attempt to fend off exploitation when all other subtle methods have failed. 
Subordinate groups, rather than being passive in the face of exploitation, often express 
resistance to the elite in covert ways that do not directly challenge the social system. For 
example, carrying out elite dictates sloppily can be a invisible form of resistance as the 
saboteur has plausible deniability in that he or she can be thought of as incompetent 
rather than acting out of malice. Refusal to give elites proper respect, often expressed as 
social snubs that can be attributed to lower class crudeness and stories about elite 
immorality traded between members of the subordinate group, constitutes another form 
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of resistance. This type of resistance is particularly interesting to Scott because stories 
about evil elites, especially if multiple people speak disparagingly about their treatment at 
the hands of the same elite, can transform individual grievances into collective 
grievances, as members of the oppressed class begin to realize a common source of 
troubles. Stories about particularly infamous oppressors achieve a myth-like status and 
are retold across several generations, transforming the subject of the tale into a symbol 
that represents the community's grievances against their oppressive conditions.  
 Creating a special conceptual category for terrorism as a specific kind of political 
violence implies that it differs from revolutions and other kinds of rebellion in some way. 
The line between terrorism and revolt can be quiet thin at times as terrorism can also be 
used as one tactic of many during revolts against those in power. However, since 
terrorism can exist independent of a larger rebellion, there is a possibility that terrorism 
springs from different sources and is committed with different motivations than other 
types of political violence. In the following section, I argue that terrorism is no different 
from other kinds of political violence as it exhibits the characteristics of ressentiment.   
The Link Between Ressentiment and Terrorism 
It would seem that all political violence directed at the powerful of society by the 
weak would be animated by ressentiment from Nietzsche‟s point of view. An inherent 
difficulty in singling out terrorism as a distinct form of political violence is creating an 
objective definition of the concept, a task which has proved elusive. Typically, 
definitions emphasize the use of violence to either force or hinder some kind of political 
change through fear and intimidation. However, Audrey Kurth Cronin (2003) points out 
that “terrorism is intended to be a matter of perception and is thus seen differently by 
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different observers” (32). Whether or not one is classed as a terrorist or a righteous 
freedom fighter is often subjective. It is a matter of where one stands in the social system 
or the success of the terrorist, as those that act on behalf of a political movement that 
gains state power can have history re-written to cast them in a positive light.  
As many definitions give terrorism a non-state character, meaning it is carried out 
by actors that are not officially connected to a legitimately recognized state, it could be 
argued that terrorism is naturally the tool of the weak or disadvantaged. The most 
powerful in society have access to the power of the state and could use that coercive 
power to force their will. The targets of a terrorist attack tend to be secondary to 
conveying the terrorist‟s disapproval towards state policy. As states are ultimately the 
arbitrator of all policy decisions, terrorism is therefore a tactic that people from a less 
powerful position in society use against the political elite.  
Cronin (2003) also claims that “terrorism is about justice, or at least someone‟s 
perception of it, whether man-made or divine” (33). This suggests that terrorists perceive 
themselves as the morally righteous party acting against an immoral party. They may 
think they are ultimately innocent of wrong-doing or that the “collateral” damage from 
their actions is justified in the name of a higher purpose, be it religious or secular. If they 
don‟t perceive themselves as the victim of wrong-doing, they may believe that they are 
acting on behalf of a third-party that is being victimized and cannot fight back.  
Thus ressentiment is a potential source of terrorism. It provides society‟s weak 
with the motivation and justification to lash out violently at the elite. It also stands firmly 
in opposition to some aspect, ranging from a single policy to the very structure of society 
itself, of the status quo and seeks to ultimately subvert the dominant view of society, 
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recasting actions and policies held to be legitimate under the status quo as illegitimate.  
Finally, people motivated by ressentiment gain a basis for moral authority from the belief 
that the powerful have injured them. These characteristics, opposition to dominant power, 
hatred of the elite, assertion of righteousness against an evil oppressor, and belief in one‟s 
status as a victim, are all aspects of ressentiment as Nietzsche described.  
Nietzsche's argument is relevant for explaining domestic and transnational 
terrorism, where at least one participant in planning or carrying out the act is not a 
member of the targeted society. Domestic terrorism is spurred on by ressentiment 
directed against the perceived injustices carried out by local and national elites. However, 
the world is increasingly interconnected and interdependent through economic and 
political ties between nations. International organizations are attempting to lay the 
foundation for institutions that provide global governance. As such, the interests and 
influence of the political and economic elite are not confined to one country and may 
even be global in reach.  
Thus the elite that terrorists rebel against may not be their local or national 
leaders, as is the case with domestic terrorists, but a foreign elite that has influence over 
the political and economic situation in their country. Transnational terrorists may be 
motivated by inequality in two ways. First, people may connect the political and 
economic inequality that exists in their society as serving the interests of foreign elites 
who collude with or control their national elite. Second, people may be radicalized if they 
believe that their home country is being subordinated politically or economically because 
of the manipulations of a foreign power, meaning their country's status is unequal relative 
to others. Once they have designated a foreign elite as the source of their grievances, they 
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can develop ressentiment towards this group. It is possible that they can feel stronger 
ressentiment toward the foreign elite rather than their national elite if they believe that 
outside forces are more morally culpable for their current situation than domestic elites.   
Nietzsche's Views on Egalitarianism 
Although Nietzsche deconstructs the notion of civilization and culture to reveal 
their brutal underpinnings, as he argues that complex social organizations and social 
customs are used as tools of oppression, he is not a radical egalitarian. Rather he decried 
such attempts to erase inequalities between groups of people as signs of cultural 
stagnation, as they would impose widespread conformity that suppresses individuality 
and ultimately destroys the differences necessary for creativity and cultural progression 
(Antonio 1995). However, he primarily associates creativity with the elites of society. 
They are the ones who are better able to exercise their will to power, as they built a 
system that is most favorable to realizing their desires.  
Nietzsche associates exercise of the will to power with vitality and health, the 
characteristics of pre-social humans that he finds most praise-worthy. People who can 
realize their will to power and societies that allow such people to flourish are the 
healthiest. In contrast, ressentiment, and the oppression that births it, has a corrosive 
effect on the human spirit. Society functions as a prison for some people, preventing them 
from following their impulses and desires, and Nietzsche associates being unable to 
exercise the will to power with ill health.  
As such, Nietzsche believed that ressentiment rendered whole segments of society 
as irredeemably corrupt. Their feelings would leave them desiring revenge against elites 
and he wrote that such people would always “crave to be hangmen,” a description that 
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supports the idea that violence is an outgrowth of ressentiment (Nietzsche 1967: 123). By 
rejecting the moral system of the elites, based on self-glorification, those afflicted with 
ressentiment would eventually adopt a moral code based on asceticism and self-
abnegation, the inverse of elite morality. Nietzsche feared that eventually this new moral 
code would create intense self-loathing and nihilism. 
Taking steps to alleviate ressentiment were useless as inequality and domination 
were inescapable facts of life. In Nietzsche‟s inegalitarian view, it was basic human 
nature that the strongest would eventually separate themselves from and conquer those 
weaker than themselves. If ressentiment was an inevitability, the best solution was to 
attempt to manage it so that it was kept harmless and contained. To achieve these ends, 
Nietzsche identified the law and ascetic religion as being instrumental to stifling the 
expression of ressentiment and directing it away from the elite. Brutal domination created 
the problem of ressentiment, but, paradoxically, in Nietzsche's view, it is also the remedy 
that keeps ressentiment from destroying the social order.  
 
Literature Review and Hypotheses 
 
Within the last decade, along with rising governmental and public concerns about 
terrorism, empirical studies also have increased. Studies focused on possible sources of 
terrorism have implications for foreign policy and domestic security. Most focus on the 
effects of regime type, absolute poverty, relative economic inequality, and economic 
globalization. The following section provides an overview of the existing research on 
these topical areas. 
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Political Inequality, Regime Type, and Terrorism 
Traditionally the social sciences have viewed economic inequality as a potential 
trigger of political violence. For Nietzsche, not only a lack of material resources, but also 
inequality in access and control of the political process can create ressentiment. By 
monopolizing political power, elites create systems that allow them to monopolize 
economic and social benefits. There are on-going academic discussions about the 
relationship between terrorism and regime-type. Although the researchers may not 
conceptualize it in terms of inequality, these studies are about political inequality because 
they hypothesize that democracies should experience less terrorism than authoritarian 
systems. Theoretically, democracy has the most political equality and should have less 
terrorism because all citizens have the right to participate in policy-making. In contrast, 
in authoritarian systems, decision-making power rests in the hands of a privileged few, 
and members of the elite circle have free reign to maintain an exclusive hold on power. 
Angered by ill-treatment and the vast power differential between the elites and everyone 
else, oppressed people may adopt terrorism to express grievances against the state 
because the closed political system leaves them no legitimate avenue to effect change in a 
peaceful manner.   
 However, several empirical studies suggest that democracy does not deter 
terrorism. Eubank and Weinberg (1994) found that terrorist groups were almost four 
times more likely to emerge in democratic countries than non-democratic countries. 
Democracies most at risk for the formation of terrorist groups were those who protected 
civil and political rights, contained large numbers of political parties, indicated high rates 
of both economic discrimination and economic growth, and demonstrated high numbers 
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of residents obtaining higher education. Several years later, the authors conducted a 
follow-up study using terrorist attacks instead of terrorist groups to test the relationship 
between terrorism and democracy (Eubank and Weinberg 1998). The new data 
reconfirmed the findings of the first study. Stable democracies experienced more terrorist 
attacks than any other type of government. Stated differently, the countries that scored 
highest on protecting civil and political rights reported the highest level of terrorist 
attacks, and absolutist governments, which scored the lowest on protecting political and 
civil rights, reported the fewest attacks. Paradoxically, these findings are almost the 
reverse of the relationship between regime type and civil war. Liberal democracies and 
repressive authoritarian states tend to be the most stable. States falling between those two 
extremes are most at risk for civil war (Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, and Gleditsch 2001). 
Quan Li (2005) built on this work by attempting to discern what aspects of 
democracy encourage and discourage terrorism. He found a negative effect for voter turn-
out. Higher rates of voter-turn out led to fewer attacks. Moreover, institutional constraints 
had a positive effect on terrorist attacks. Higher constraints against civil rights 
curtailment were associated with an increase in terrorist attacks. Having a higher GDP 
per capita also had a negative effect on terrorism, while having a history of terrorist 
activities had a positive effect on terrorism, as terrorist groups, once established, 
continued operating within their home countries.  
What explains this link between democracy and terrorism? There are several 
explanations for these findings. Quan Li (2005) relates the higher number of terrorist 
attacks on democratic nations to freedom of the press. When governments cannot easily 
suppress information, news organizations are able to call attention to terrorist incidents. 
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Therefore, democracies become targets of terrorism because the press can disseminate the 
terrorists‟ message to a large audience. This may also have the secondary effect of 
skewing the data to make it look like democracies experience more terrorism when non-
democratic systems may merely be better at suppressing information about attacks within 
their borders. Eubank and Weinberg (1994) suggest that democratic freedoms make it 
easier for terrorists to operate within and attack democratic countries since the restraints 
that prevent the government from curtailing civil liberties also make it more difficult to 
detect terrorist activity. These explanations stress that the institutional features of 
democratic systems provide the motivation for terrorists to attack them rather than 
suggesting that there is something radicalizing about democratic politics.  
However, the relationship between political systems and terrorism could be 
parsed out more finely. These studies neglect the role that political inequality within 
democracies might play a role in encouraging terrorism. Nietzsche (1967) implied that 
ressentiment was inherent to a democratic political system when he called democracy 
“the modern misarchism,” or hatred of being governed (78). He also felt that liberal 
democratic ideals could never be satisfactorily realized in practice. The disparity between 
democracy's promise and its reality could be intolerable for some. They would reject 
living under an imperfect system and try to destroy it to remake society so it could be 
compatible with their ideals (Diken 2009). People in democracies reject the very idea that 
there should be a group endowed with greater privileges and seeks to guard against 
anyone who would attempt to exert their will to power and claim greater status. Political 
theorist Judith Shklar (1989) argues that the basis of liberalism, the political philosophy 
intimately tied with modern democracy, is fear of having pain, suffering, and cruelty 
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inflicted on one's person by a more powerful entity. For this reason, the ability of the 
state as well as powerful social and economic actors, must be checked in order for people 
to live free from terror and abuse. Nietzsche sees a ruling class, differentiated from the 
rest of the population by special status, as integral to a social system. In theory, 
democratic states are not supposed to make distinction between citizens. No citizen has 
more or fewer rights than any other citizen. However, state policies and the general 
public in democracies often do differentiate between citizens and non-citizens, as non-
citizens are not seen as being entitled to the same rights as citizens of a country.  
The full set of political rights is typically reserved for citizens of a country. Not 
everyone who lives inside a country is a citizen, and all democracies do not have the 
same naturalization systems. Some have higher barriers to gaining citizenship, and 
therefore to obtaining full political rights, than others. Not being of a particular ethnic 
group can disqualify a person from citizenship in some countries. For example, Germany 
only granted citizenship to ethnic Germans for many years. High barriers to citizenship 
create permanent immigrant communities barred from becoming full members of the 
national political community. The political inequality between citizens and non-citizens 
puts non-citizens at the margins of the political system, unable to air grievances through 
legitimate political channels. They may feel particularly vulnerable if their presence is 
defined as a problem by citizens of the country. Non-citizens are at the mercy of others 
who may petition their government to enact policies harmful to them, which can turn 
political exclusion into economic and social exclusion. Under hostile circumstances and 
with no other avenues open to them, this political inequality within democracies may 
cause the marginalized to turn to terrorism. Exposure to democratic ideals can prove 
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radicalizing as it creates a philosophical and moral justification for terrorism against the 
state when the government fails to be inclusive.    
In the last several decades in liberal democratic countries, the prevailing view on 
the political rights of citizens has come to include the notion that rights should not be 
abridged based on immutable characteristics such as race, ethnicity, or gender. The belief 
that citizens that do not belong to culturally privileged groups should be given fewer 
political rights than those that do has largely gone out of style in mature democracies. 
However, many democracies curtail political rights for criminals, effectively conferring 
an abridged form of citizenship. Many people think that breaking the laws of society is 
both voluntary and the need for punishment justifies revoking certain rights. Depending 
on the nature and seriousness of the crime, voting rights may be forfeited. The length of 
time that political rights are abridged varies, from the amount of time required to serve 
out a prison sentence to life. 
People in democracies have adopted an ideology that repudiates the idea of a 
ruling class residing over a ruled class. Components of that ideology, such as the 
universality of political and civil rights, may be perceived by those excluded from the 
political system as giving them a legitimate claim to political participation and supporting 
their inclusion into political life. Marginalized people in democratic states may be more 
vulnerable to the radicalizing effects of political inequality than their counter-parts in 
non-democracies because the messages that the marginalized receive in authoritarian 
states reinforce unequal political privileges. This may be done through active measures, 
via propaganda or state repression, that encourage people to keep to their place by not 
asking for greater political rights or it may be done more subtly by making the political 
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process invisible from the public. If the process is completely cut off from public 
scrutiny, it may not even occur to people that they could have a voice in politics or even 
imagine how their lives could be different if those privileges were not monopolized by an 
elite few.  
More simply stated the democratic ideology portrays exclusion from national 
political life as an injustice. It is from this injury that ressentiment develops, pushing 
frustrated people to adopt militant ideologies that promise the political liberation that the 
democratic state has failed to give them. However, at the same time, they can also use the 
civil liberties that democracies grant them to tap into or create national and international 
networks that support terrorist activities (Wiest 2007). In authoritarian states, exclusion is 
a fact of life for most people. However, this is not to imply that no person chafes under 
the restricted political rights of authoritarian regimes, but the empirical literature seems to 
support the idea that authoritarianism is better at keeping a lid on ressentiment through 
repression.  
Depending on the laws of the nation, some countries will have higher degrees of 
political inequality than others. This will be true even among democratic countries. 
Therefore, it is not enough to talk about political inequality in terms of regime type, as 
such broad categorizations can only reveal that inequality exists between different types 
of systems. A better way to study political inequality would be to have a standardized 
measure that can quantify how much inequality exists for each country, regardless of 
regime type. Based on Nietzsche's theoretical ideas and on the empirical research 
discussed above one would expect political inequality to have a stronger effect on 
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ressentiment in liberal democracies than in other regime types. Formally stated, the first 
two hypotheses are: 
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between political inequality and 
ressentiment.  
Hypothesis 2: The positive relationship between political inequality and 
ressentiment is stronger in liberal democracies than in other regime types. 
As will be discussed in greater detail in the methods section, I operationalize 
political inequality as the percentage of the population excluded from voting, and I 
operationalize ressentiment as the degree that people in a society perceived the elites as 
corrupt. Therefore, the percentage of the national population denied voting rights is 
positively related to perceptions of elite corruption.  
Terrorism and Absolute Poverty   
On the economic side of the terrorism debate, one line of reasoning in the 
literature argues that terrorism is caused by the extreme inequality related to widespread 
poverty. Poverty creates fertile ground for terrorist groups to spring from through 
desperation. The poor are more willing to take drastic measures against those in power 
because they feel like they have nothing left to lose. Essentially, the benefits that they 
could receive if they successfully forced governments to shift their policies would be 
greater than the loss they may incur for participating in terrorist actions. It is also 
assumed that poverty and its consequences, such as diminished chances for education and 
marginalization in political life, leave the poor especially vulnerable to the influence of 
radical ideologies.  
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Empirical tests, however, cast doubt on the link between absolute poverty and 
terrorism. Alberto Abadie (2006), using country specific terrorism risk ratings, found that 
poor countries, measured by GDP per capita and scores on the Human Development and 
Gini indices, do not experience significantly higher risk levels than rich countries. 
Economic measures had no statistically significant effect on the risk for terrorist 
incidents. However, lack of political rights did exert a positive effect on terrorism risk 
ratings, but the effect was more pronounced among states that were fairly repressive 
rather than states that received the lowest possible score for protection of political rights. 
This suggests that states in the process of political liberalization or transitioning to 
democracy are at the greatest risk of terrorist attacks. People lack of enough rights to 
provoke them into rebellion against the state, but they have enough legal protection to 
make the state less effective at repressing terrorism.     
Krueger and Maleckova (2003) also shed doubt on the idea that the poor are more 
likely to become terrorists than people economically better off. Their study consists of 
two separate parts. In the first, they try to gauge among what groups in society is support 
for terrorism the strongest and weakest. Using public opinion data from the Palestinian 
Center for Policy and Survey Research, they found a positive relationship between 
education and support for armed attacks against Israel and the a negative relationship 
between education and support for dialogue with Israel. When the data were broken down 
along occupation types, support for attacks against Israel was strongest among students, 
and weakest among the unemployed, a group that is in an economically precarious 
position. Supporting terrorism is quite different from participating in it, but the 
researchers seem to suggest that sympathizers constitute a potential pool of recruits. In 
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the second part of the study, they try to determine the socio-economic background of 
people who take part in terrorist activities. Available autobiographical data about 
deceased Lebanese Hezbollah fighters and Palestinian suicide bombers indicated that 
terrorists backgrounds typically included a high level of education and socio-economic 
status. Consequently, the poor are underrepresented in terrorist organizations. From these 
findings, they argue that economic development as an anti-terrorist strategy is of limited 
utility as terrorists are not overwhelmingly recruited from a society‟s poorest members. 
However, by the authors‟ own admission, it is possible that the data are not reflective of a 
terrorist organization‟s entire membership, and, if it is representative, these results may 
not be generalizable to terrorist groups motivated by different ideologies or located in 
countries outside the Middle East.  
Several scholars have offered explanations for why terrorist recruits do not come 
from the very poor. Bueno de Mesquita (2005) claims that this tendency is explained by 
supply and demand. He theorizes that the supply for potential terrorists outstrips terrorist 
organizations‟ demand for recruits. A more highly educated terrorist sympathizer, with 
all the advantages that a higher class background provides, has more utility to a terrorist 
group than a poorly educated sympathizer from an impoverished background. Thus the 
organization is more likely to accept the one who is judged more beneficial. In other 
words, terrorist organizations put a higher premium on the quality of recruits than the 
quantity of recruits, so the poor are more likely to be weeded out in favor of people from 
more privileged backgrounds. Michael Mousseau (2003) claims that the social elites have 
greater motivation for turning to terrorism. He believes that terrorism is ultimately rooted 
in the pressures that modernization exerts on traditional society. The modernization 
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process seeks to displace clientalist networks with a market based economic system. 
Since those with higher social position tended to have the terms of exchange tilted in 
their favor in clientalist networks, they have more to lose than the poor when outside 
forces threaten to break those networks down. For this reason, the wealthier people in 
society are more likely to turn to terrorism since it is in their rational interest to attempt to 
halt the modernization process. 
Some scholars would agree with Krueger and Maleckova‟s recommendation that 
economic development should not be used as an anti-terrorism strategy, but would 
disagree with the reasoning behind the conclusion. Rather, they would say that 
development serves as a catalyst rather than an antidote for violence and unrest. 
Jacqueline Best (2007) theorizes that the development model currently promoted by the 
Bretton Woods financial institutions stress a specific economic and political model that 
countries must adopt to receive development aid. The model is amenable to the needs of 
global capital and seeks to instill norms in government to favor free capital flows and 
economic rationalization. Failure to conform to these norms means that countries will be 
denied development assistance both from the Bretton Woods institutions themselves and 
private investors that rely on the Bretton Woods institutions‟ judgments about the 
economic and political soundness of a country. In doing so, the Bretton Woods 
institutions are "effectively deciding whose lives are worth living," as they have the 
power to decide who will be condemned to continued poverty and who will be lifted out 
of it (Best 2007: 102). Under conditions where the gatekeepers of development are 




Relative Economic Inequality, Globalization, and Terrorism  
Many other studies have tried to determine if relative economic inequality rather 
than poverty provokes terrorism. Edward N. Muller (1985) found a positive relationship 
between income inequality and the number of deaths resulting from political violence 
between 1958 to 1977. Perhaps due to the fact that it can be difficult to separate terrorism 
from other forms of violent rebellion, Muller lumps all forms of political violence 
together making it impossible to assess if income inequality effects distinct types of 
political violence differently. Terrorism can be used as a tactic that accompanies violent 
rebellion, but unless researchers can satisfactorily study terrorism in isolation from other 
kinds of political violence, they can not account for terrorist incidents that are not tied to 
civil wars.  
Some studies explore the effects of globalization on terrorism, assuming that the 
economic and cultural changes globalization brings are potential sources for increased 
terrorist activity. These studies tend to conceptualize globalization as a possible source of 
inequality, eroding the standard of living of some members of a society while making 
others quite well off. Globalization is also a force that can make people aware of how 
better or worse their conditions are compared with the rest of the world. Omar Lizardo 
(2006) found mixed results for the hypothesis that globalization, since it can increase 
inequality, is linked to increased transnational terrorism. He found that increased 
integration into global trade networks had a negative effect on terrorism. However, there 
was a positive relationship between terrorism and foreign direct investment, a measure of 
financial globalization. Lizardo also found a positive relationship between terrorism and 
cultural globalization. Cultural globalization allows non-governmental organizations to 
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spread a model of political action that emphasizes the idea that individuals can work 
together using rational plans of action to produce meaningful social changes in society. 
This led him to conclude that cultural globalization may empower people who are angry 
with the inequality caused by certain types of economic globalization to take action 
against those that they believe have wronged them. In contrast, Li and Schaub (2004) 
found that economic globalization in the forms of trade, direct foreign investment, and 
portfolio investment did not directly increase the incidents of terrorism within countries. 
They suggest that globalization may have an indirect negative effect on terrorism, as 
economic interconnectedness can promote economic growth and reduce poverty.  
These studies measure economic globalization as trade and investment. As such, 
they do not satisfactorily test the link between terrorism and inequality because the 
authors assume globalization causes increased economic inequality. It seems that a study 
that directly tests the relationship between terrorism and economic inequality is badly 
needed. 
Theoretically, relative economic inequality would be more in line with the 
creation of ressentiment than absolute poverty. Theories that associate terrorism with 
absolute poverty assume that only the very poor will rebel. However, the dynamics of 
ressentiment are such one need not occupy the lowest level of society to chafe under it. 
Rather, the idea that someone else has a higher position than one‟s self and is somehow 
responsible for one's subordinate position is the trigger that provokes hatred of them. 
Therefore, it remains possible for anyone who is not among the elite to engage in 
terrorism.   
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The idea that the effects of wealth inequality are more keenly felt in democratic 
systems and more likely to spark political violence has ancient roots. In Greek 
democracy, citizens were supposed to have an equal share of political power. Aristotle 
(2000) theorized that in democracies people may start to believe that political equality 
entitles them to equality in other areas. While democracies were more internally stable 
than other kinds of political systems, they were the most vulnerable to the effects of 
economic inequality. An increase in the number of very rich people may cause the non-
wealthy to revolt against them, fearing that wealth inequality would start to erode 
political equality. For Aristotle, this fear was not completely groundless as he thought 
that wealthy families might revolt against the democratic state and set up an oligarchy, or 
rule by a group of elites, if they began to think that their greater share of wealth entitled 
them to a greater share of political power. In contrast, under non-democratic systems, 
there is no expectation of equality between societal members in any aspect of life.  
In ancient Greece, citizenship was a rather restricted category, as it did not extend 
to women, foreigners, and current or former slaves, when compared to modern ideas 
about citizenship found in liberal democracies. However, expectations of political 
equality and equality before the law may cause liberal democracies to be vulnerable to 
ressentiment in the face of economic inequality. People may start to believe that 
institutions are biased in favor of people with more money, eroding their faith that the 
political system is impartial. They may believe that it serves the interests of the wealthiest 
citizens at the expensive of the common good, essentially increasing the elites' share of 
wealth by diminishing everyone else's. Under these conditions, ressentiment grows when 
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people start to believe that the system favors the wealthy elites at their expense and the 
trappings of democracy are merely a sham to hide how the system really works.  
In contrast, in other non-liberal regimes, the lack of notions of equality in the 
political sphere should make it more difficult to make a resonant philosophical argument 
for economic equality. However, this does not preclude that ideologies that link social 
and political advantages to economic advantages will not develop, causing ressentiment 
to rise against economic elites. These ideas suggest the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3: There is a positive relationship between economic inequality and 
ressentiment.  
Hypothesis 4: The positive relationship between economic inequality and 
ressentiment is stronger in liberal democracies than in other regime types. 
I operationalize economic inequality as income inequality as measured by the 
Gini coefficient. Therefore, as the Gini coefficient increases, denoting rising economic 
inequality, perceptions of elite corruption will also increase. 
In previous sections, I have discussed the link between ressentiment, political 
violence more broadly, and terrorism more specifically. The basic idea, as laid out by 
Nietzsche, is that political violence requires an ideological basis and moral justification 
before people will act against an oppressor. People must have a hatred of the elite 
stemming from injustices suffered at the hands of the powerful, and Nietzsche calls this 
state of mind ressentiment. It is assumed that the ideology of democratic states spreads 
expectations for equality. When these expectations are not met, people are more likely to 
perceive their unequal status as an injustice. This yields the following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 5: The relationship between ressentiment and terrorism is positive.  
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Hypothesis 6: The positive relationship between ressentiment and terrorism is 
stronger in liberal democracies than in other regime types. 
I operationalize terrorism as the number of terrorist incidents that take place 
within a nation's borders. Therefore, as the degree that elites are believed to be corrupt 
increases, terrorist incidents also will increase within the country. 
Taken collectively, the hypotheses suggest that ressentiment is an intervening 
variable that mediates some portion of the influence of political and economic inequality 
on terrorism. As Nietzsche theorized, both types of inequality have a positive effect on 
ressentiment, which in turn has a positive effect on terrorism. Figure 1 shows the causal 
model implied by the hypotheses. The hypotheses also suggest that all of the effects 




























The nation-state is the unit of analysis for this study, as the theory assumes that 
state policies generate inequality, creating ressentiment, and in turn triggering terrorism. 
There are only a limited number of states currently in existence, with the United States 
government acknowledging a total of 195 independent nations in the world (U.S. 
Department of State 2009). When dealing with cross-national data, missing data are often 
a problem. The sample consists of the nations which had available data for all five 
variables included in the study. Eighty-two countries are not included in the sample 
because of  missing data for one or more variable.    
Additionally, the data had two outliers in India and Pakistan. These countries had 
520 and 552 terrorist attacks respectively, twice as many as the country with the third 
highest number of terrorist incidents. Compared to data from 2007, India's number of 
attacks more than tripled and Pakistan's number doubled in 2008. India and Pakistan 
share a tumultuous history, as they have been locked into territorial conflict for several 
decades. After fighting several wars over the disputed territory, without either side 
annexing it, both countries maintain an armed presence in the territory. Sometimes small 
skirmishes between military units break out along the border of the land that each side 
controls. Pakistan nurtured terrorist groups for the specific purpose of attacking Indian 
targets to whittle away at their opponent's will to keep the territory without a direct 
military conflict (Jones 2002). Before beginning the analysis, I decided to delete these 
countries from the sample, as these extreme values could be explained by conflict related 
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factors, variables that this model cannot account explain. Had the outliers not been 
attached to a conflict dyad, they would have been included in the final sample. The final 
sample consists of 111 countries, fifty-six are liberal democracies and fifty-five are some 
other regime type. 
Measurement 
 The dependent variable, terrorism, is measured by the number of terrorist 
incidents that occur within a country‟s border during the year 2008. The data for the 
analysis come from the Global Terrorism Database or GTD, a dataset that collects 
extensive information about terrorist incidents from publicly available sources and 
encompasses the years between 1970 and 2008. Since defining terrorism is a highly 
contested debate, I use the GTD‟s definition of terrorism. For an incident to be included 
in the dataset, it must be an intentional act performed by a non-state actor that uses or 
threatens to use violence against property or human targets. It must also meet two of three 
criteria. The first criterion is that the act must be motivated by political, economic, 
religious, or social goals. The second is that it is intended to convey a message to an 
audience beyond the immediate victims of the attack. The third is that the action falls 
outside of what is defined as legitimate wartime conduct by international law (Global 
Terrorism Database 2009).  The GDT includes both threats and attacks that were actually 
carried out. Threats of terrorism can be effective in terms of inspiring fear, disrupting the 
normal flow of daily life, and undermining confidence in the nation‟s leaders. Therefore, 
I will include both threats and successfully completed attacks as terrorist incidents.  
This study identifies three independent variables. The first, regime type, refers to 
a state's system of government. For the purposes of this study, I sort the liberal 
30 
 
democracies into one category and all other government types, be they partial 
democracies or authoritarian, into another. Liberal democracies are those systems of 
government where selection for people to fill key government positions are decided 
through elections and the legal system codifies in law and enforces the protection of 
social, political, and economic freedoms from undue government interference. I 
determine if a country is a liberal democracy through data provided by Freedom House 
from 2009, which evaluates the previous year of 2008. To be classified as a liberal 
democracy, the country must have been acknowledged as an electoral democracy, the 
data for which runs from 1989 to 2009. However, according to Freedom House's 
definition of an electoral democracy, not all countries that qualify as electoral 
democracies are liberal democracies. Electoral democracies must have a multiparty 
system, periodic elections free from corruption and fraud, voting rights for all adult 
citizens, with the exception of criminals, and parties must be allowed to express their 
political platforms openly and without censorship. While electoral democracies enjoy 
political freedoms, they can lag behind liberal democracies in terms of having expansive 
civil liberties (Freedom House 2009). 
Therefore, to distinguish liberal democracies from electoral democracies, 
Freedom House must also have given the country the designation of “free” in their annual 
country reports. The results of these reports are available for the years 1972 to 2009. In 
the annual reports, Freedom House evaluates the country‟s performance on two aspects: 
political rights and civil liberties. In each category, the country receives a score that 
ranges from one to seven, with one being most free and seven being least free. The 
political rights and civil liberties scores for the year are then averaged. Using Freedom 
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House's (2009) designations, countries with scores that range between one and two and a 
half are “free,” those with scores between three and five are “partly free,” and those with 
scores between five and a half and seven are “not free.” Those countries designated both 
electoral democracies and free are considered to be liberal democracies and are coded 
one. All others are coded zero.  
The second independent variable, economic inequality, refers to the degree to 
which economic resources are unevenly distributed within a country. The Gini Index, 
which measures such income inequality by showing how evenly incomes are distributed 
across a population, is used to measure income inequality. Gini coefficients can range 
from zero to one or from zero to one hundred. The data for this project come from the 
CIA World Factbook, which uses the zero to one hundred scale. Zero represents perfect 
equality, with income evenly spread across all societal members, and one hundred 
represents perfect inequality, with all income in the possession of one person (Central 
Intelligence Agency). Gini coefficients are not calculated on a regular basis, and 
therefore, different countries have Gini coefficients based on data from different years. A 
total of 135 countries have Gini coefficients. Therefore, I have only included those Gini 
coefficients that have been calculated between the years 2000 and 2008, working under 
the assumption that most countries will not experience significant changes in wealth 
distribution within the span of a few years. On occasions when a country had two Gini 
coefficients calculated during this period, I included the most recent one. 
 The third independent variable is political inequality. Political inequality is the 
degree to which people are excluded from the political decision making process. To make 
a standardized measure that can be used to make comparisons between all countries, 
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regardless of regime type, I operationalize political inequality as the percentage of a 
nation‟s population that is not extended voting rights. This measure, the Exclusion Index, 
is a crude indicator of political inequality because it cannot account for, through lack of 
data, people who are barred from the political process through social pressure, 
intimidation, or tactics on behalf of those in power to make it difficult or impossible for 
undesirable groups to participate in elections even though they are legally guaranteed 
franchise. The Exclusion Index uses a scale that goes from zero to one hundred, with one 
hundred representing all people excluded from the political process and zero representing 
the inclusion of all people.  
For authoritarian systems, the country automatically receives a score of 99.9, as it 
is assumed that only a small portion of the population has effective political decision-
making power. To qualify as an authoritarian state, based on the data from Freedom 
House, the country must not be classified as an electoral democracy and have an overall 
status of "not free" in the year 2008. For mature democracies and democratizing 
countries, a country's score depends on the size of two groups: the immigrant population 
and the prison population. The immigrant population is included in the measure because 
it represents people who are living inside a country who may not be considered citizens 
and therefore cannot vote. The other group included in the measure is the prison 
population. Under Freedom House's definition of electoral democracy, the only adult 
citizens that the state can deny voting rights to are criminals. When a member of a society 
breaks the laws of society, as part of their punishment some benefits of societal 
membership may be revoked. Human rights evaluations usually report about the 
treatment of prisoners while they are incarcerated, but they rarely focus on the state of ex-
33 
 
prisoners' political and civil rights after they have been released. This indicates that there 
is consensus among many human rights advocates that it is permissible for the state to 
exclude convicted criminals from the voting population and that the issue of former 
prisoners' political rights are not considered serious injustices in need of remedy.       
Data concerning these populations come from two sources. The percent of the 
total population comprised of immigrants comes from World Population Policies 2007. 
This publication contains demographic information for each country, including what 
percentage of the population was made up by immigrants in the year 2005, the most 
recent year with available data (United Nations). Data on the prison population come 
from the eighth edition of the World Prison Population List (Walmsley 2009). This report 
gathers the number of people held in prisons in countries and territories around the world 
for the year 2008 or the next most recent year that the information is available. 
Population data are presented as total number of prisoners rather than as percentage of the 
population. Therefore, I have divided the prison population by the total country 
population, also given in the report, to come up with what percent of the population is 
currently incarcerated. To determine the countries final score on the Exclusion Index, the 
two percentages are added together.  
The final variable is ressentiment, the intervening variable. Ressentiment is a 
hatred of the elite by the less powerful that stems from the perceived evil or unethical 
actions that powerful and prominent people have committed against them. Inequality 
triggers ressentiment because people may perceive elite advantages as being dependent 
on someone else's disadvantage. I operationalize ressentiment as the degree to which the 
government of a country is considered corrupt. Corruption within the public sector carries 
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with it the connotation that the elite are unethical, as they are using their position for 
personal gain at public expense, and therefore are untrustworthy. The sense that the 
political elite harm others for their own ill-gotten gain and that they act immorally in 
doing so are elements of ressentiment. To measure perceived corruption, I use the 2008 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). Based on a scoring system that runs from zero to 
ten, with numbers closer to ten being the least corrupt and numbers closer to zero being 
the most corrupt, the CPI assigns 180 countries a yearly score based on data collected and 
then standardized from thirteen surveys that query experts about corruption among 
governments. The CPI and all the surveys that it uses in its evaluations share the same 
definition of corruption in that it is "misuse of public power for private benefits" 
(Lambsdorff 2008: 4). Seven of the surveys rely on the perceptions of knowledgeable 
outsiders, typically Westerners that are not residents of the countries that they evaluate.  
The other six surveys query citizens of the country under evaluation, typically prominent 
businesspeople. The CPI uses both the perspective of cultural insiders and outsiders 
because only using one group could be problematic. Together both kinds of surveys can 
make up for the short-comings of each type by itself. Residents of a particular country 
may be tempted to rate the government by local cultural standards rather than by the 
surveyors' definition of corruption. Non-citizens lack the intimate understanding of and 
familiarity with a society that living in it for many years provides. The CPI claims that 
the evaluations of each survey type have a high correlation with each other, meaning that 




Even though this measure is based on expert opinion, there are reasons to believe 
that the CPI is still a viable proxy for the perceptions of the general public. When 
researchers compared data from the 2008 CPI against the 2009 Global Corruption 
Barometer (GCB), an international survey that asks members of the general population 
about their perceptions of and experiences with corruption, they found a negative 
correlation between expert and public opinion. They also found that the CPI scores were 
negatively correlated with the number of people in each country that self-reported paying 
a bribe (Transparency International 2009). Given that high CPI scores indicate low levels 
of corruption, this means that when expert perception of corruption was high, public 
perception of corruption also tended to be high. Although the GCB is a much more direct 
measure of corruption perceptions, it draws respondents from a limited number of 
countries. Therefore, using the 2007 GCB, as the survey was not conducted in 2008, in 
place of the CPI would shrink the sample by more than half. 
I subtract each country's 2008 CPI score from ten to reverse the scoring system so 
that an increase in the score represents an increase in perceived corruption. Under the 
reversed coding system, numbers closer to zero indicate a lack of corruption and numbers 
closer to ten represent high levels of corruption. I did this to harmonize the CPI with the 
others measures in this study.  
Statistical Procedures 
 The first step in the analysis will be to run the descriptive statistics to determine 
the mean and standard deviation for each variable. These statistics along with the 
correlation matrices will be presented for the total sample, for liberal democracies, and 
for other regime types. 
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 I will test the hypotheses using path analysis, a regression-based procedure used 
to determine the extent that the effects of independent variables on a dependent variable 
are direct as opposed to being mediated through one or more intervening variables 
(Munro 1997). Path analysis is appropriate because my hypotheses assume that the 
independent variables "cause" terrorism by working through an intervening variable, 
ressentiment.  
As shown earlier in Figure 1, economic inequality and political inequality are 
predicted to have a direct positive effect on ressentiment. Ressentiment, in turn, is 
predicted to have a direct positive effect on terrorism. Therefore, economic inequality and 
political inequality are expected to have positive indirect effects on terrorism that are 
transmitted through ressentiment. It is possible, however, that any effect economic 
inequality and/or political inequality have on terrorism is direct (not transmitted through 
ressentiment) rather than indirect. Therefore, I will estimate the parameters of a "fully 
recursive" model that includes all possible paths, both direct and indirect, from the 
inequality variables to terrorism. The fully recursive model is shown in Figure 2. 
 The parameters of this model, as measured by the standardized regression (path) 
coefficients and unstandardized regression coefficients, will be estimated twice: once for 
liberal democracies and once for other regime types. If hypotheses 1, 3, and 5 are correct, 
the path coefficients for liberal democracies and other regime types will be positive and 
statistically significant at the .05 level. If hypotheses 2, 4, and 6 are correct, the path 
coefficients (as measured by unstandardized coefficients) should be more strongly 
positive for liberal democracies than for other regime types. Tests for interaction using 
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the entire sample will be conducted to determine if effects are significantly stronger in 














       
Figure 2 




Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlations 
 Table 1 displays the means and standard deviations of each variable used in the 
analysis. Since the hypotheses predict that the findings for liberal democracies differ 
from those for other regime types, the table is divided to present descriptive statistics for 
the total sample, liberal democracies only, and other regime types only. For each 
variable, the means are larger among the other regime types than the liberal democracies, 
indicating that on average other regime types have higher levels of political and 










are especially large (36.011 for other regime types and 8.323 for the liberal democracies) 
as are the mean differences in ressentiment (7.091 versus 4.200). However, since liberal 




Means and Standard Deviations for all Variables (Total Sample=111, Liberal 
Democracies=56, and Other Regime Types=55) 
Sample Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Maximum Minimum 
Total Sample Political 
Inequality 21.996 35.372 99.9 .2 
 Economic 
Inequality 39.477 9.741 70.7 23.0 
 Regime Type .500 .502 1.0 0.0 
 Ressentiment 5.632 2.212 8.6 .7 




Inequality 8.232 8.465 39.9 .2 
 Economic 
Inequality 36.663 10.561 70.7 23.0 
 Ressentiment 4.200 2.041 7.5 .7 




Inequality 36.011 45.599 99.9 .4 
 Economic 
Inequality 42.344 7.943 59.2 26.7 
 Ressentiment 7.091 1.196 8.6 .8 
 Terrorism 21.690 52.713 249.0 0.0 
 
 As a first step in the analyses, correlation matrices were run for the total sample, 
liberal democracies, and other regime types. These correlations do not take statistical 
controls or the role the intervening variable, ressentiment, plays in mediating the effects 
of the exogenous variables on terrorism into account. Thus the correlation coefficients are 
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of limited value in testing the hypotheses and are mainly presented for descriptive 
interest. It is worth noting that in the table that displays the matrix for the total sample 
(Table 2) the relationship between political inequality and ressentiment is positive as is 
the relationship between economic inequality and ressentiment. Both relationships are 
moderately strong, significant at the .001 and .01 levels respectively. This is consistent 
with hypotheses 1 and 3. However, the correlations do not support hypothesis 5 which 
states that the relationship between ressentiment and terrorism is positive. While the 
relationship is in the predicted direction, it is not statistically significant. The strongest 
correlation in the table is between regime type and ressentiment. The relationship is quite 
strong and negative (-.656), indicating that liberal democracies have much lower levels of 
ressentiment than do other regime types. Referring back to Table 1, the mean level of 
ressentiment is 4.200 in liberal democracies and 7.091 in other regimes. This is a 
difference of almost three scale points on a measure that ranges from zero to ten.  
 
Table 2 








Inequality -.068    
Regime 
Type -.293** -.394***   
Ressentiment .382*** .271** -.656***  
Terrorism .153 -.035 -.181† .108 
      
  †p≤0.10, *p≤ 0.05, **p≤ 0.01, ***p≤ 0.001 
 
 The correlations between the variables change substantially when the sample is 
divided by regime type. Table 3 displays the correlation matrices for liberal democracies 
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below the diagonal and other regime types above the diagonal. Consistent with 
hypothesis 3, among liberal democracies there is a positive and highly significant 
relationship between economic inequality and ressentiment. However, the correlation 
between political inequality and ressentiment is highly significant, moderately strong, 
and, contrary to hypothesis 1, negative. Moreover, the relationship between ressentiment 
and terrorism fails to reach significance at the .05 level. Among other regimes, the 
correlations fail to support hypotheses 1, 3, and 5. Neither political inequality nor 
economic inequality has a significant positive relationship with ressentiment (hypotheses 
1 and 3) nor does ressentiment have a significant positive relationship with terrorism 
(hypothesis 5). Although unpredicted by the hypotheses, in liberal democracies there is a 
positive and highly significant correlation between political inequality and terrorism. 
 
Table 3 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients for all Variables (Liberal Democracies, N=56, and 




Inequality Ressentiment Terrorism 
Economic 
Inequality  -.281* -.157 .184 
Political 
Inequality -.295*  .188 -.164 
Ressentiment .447*** -.474***  .011 
Terrorism .012 .490*** -.061  
  







Path Analysis Results 
 As noted above, the bivariate correlations are of limited use in determining if the 
hypotheses are supported. They do not control for other variables included in the models 
nor do they access the role ressentiment plays in mediating the effects of the exogenous 
variables on terrorism
1
. The path analyses accomplish both of these goals. Hypotheses 1, 
3, and 5 predict that the effects of political and economic inequality on ressentiment are 
positive and that the effect of ressentiment on terrorism is positive.  
 To test these hypotheses, the parameters of the path model shown in Figure 1 are 
estimated separately for liberal democracies and other regime types. The results for 
liberal democracies are displayed in Table 4 where the total effects are decomposed into 
their direct and indirect effects. In instances where no variable intervenes between an 
independent and dependent variables, a total effect equals a direct effect.
2
  
 Table 4 shows the decomposition of effects for liberal democracies. Political 
inequality exerts a rather strong negative effect on ressentiment, which directly 
contradicts hypothesis 1. However, the relationship between economic inequality and 
ressentiment is positive, as predicted by hypothesis 3. Both of these relationships are 
significant at the .01 level and collectively explain 32.8 percent of the variation in 
ressentiment. The relationship between ressentiment and terrorism is positive, as 
predicted by hypothesis 5, but it is not significant even at the .10 level. Therefore, 
                                                 
 
1
 During this stage of the analysis, a multicollinearity diagnostic was performed. All variables 




For interested readers, the results of the path analysis conducted for the total sample are 
presented in Appendix A. Those results are not particularly informative because results are expected to 
differ based on regime type. Furthermore, in the total sample model, the lack of statistical significance for 










Variable Total Effects 
Indirect 
Effects Direct Effects 
Ressentiment Political 
Inequality -.375**  -.375** 
 Economic 
Inequality .336**  .336** 
 R²   .328 
Terrorism Political 
Inequality .540*** -.067 .607*** 
 Economic 
Inequality .171 .060 .111 
 Ressentiment .177  .177 
 R²   .288 
 
†p≤0.10, *p≤ 0.05, **p≤ 0.01, ***p≤ 0.001 
 
ressentiment plays a very limited role in mediating the effects of exogenous variables on 
terrorism. Both political inequality and economic inequality have much smaller indirect 
than direct effects. 
 While political inequality suppresses ressentiment, it also exerts a strong positive 
direct effect on terrorism (path coefficient = .607: p<.001), which was not predicted by 
the theory. The model explains 28.8 percent of the variation in terrorism which is largely 
attributable to the direct effect of political inequality. The direct effect of economic 
inequality on terrorism fails to reach significance. Figure 3 presents the path model with 
all the standardized direct effect coefficients shown.  
 The model for the other regime types (Table 5) fails to support hypotheses 1, 3, 
and 5. Neither political inequality nor economic inequality has a significant positive 
effect on ressentiment which, in turn, does not have a significant positive effect on 





   †p≤0.10,*p≤ 0.05, **p≤ 0.01, ***p≤ 0.001 
Figure 3 




























that are essentially zero. The model only explains 4.7 percent of the variance in 
ressentiment and only 5.1 percent of the variance in terrorism. Even though none of the 
variables has significant effects, Figure 4 displays the path coefficients for each direct 
effect. 
 
 Table 5 
Decomposition of Standardized Regression Effects in a Model of Terrorism (Other 




Variable Total Effects 
Indirect 
Effects Direct Effects 
Ressentiment Political 
Inequality .157  .157 
 Economic 
Inequality -.113  -.113 
 R²   .047 
Terrorism Political 
Inequality -.122 .010 -.132 
 Economic 
Inequality .150 -.007 .157 
 Ressentiment .060  .060 
 R²   .051 
 
†p≤0.10, *p≤ 0.05, **p≤ 0.01, ***p≤ 0.001 
 
 So far the focus has been on testing hypotheses 1, 3, and 5, which are concerned 
with whether or not the direct effects of the exogenous variables on ressentiment are 
positive and with whether or not the direct effect of ressentiment on terrorism is positive. 
Only hypothesis 3 (economic inequality has a positive effect on ressentiment) received 
support and that support was limited to liberal democracies. 
 Hypotheses 2, 4, and 6 predict that the expected positive effects are stronger 
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predicted positive effect received support, the path model for liberal democracies proved 
to be a much better predictor of ressentiment and terrorism (as evidenced by the 
explained variance) than did the model for the other regime types. This suggests that 
effects are generally stronger in liberal democracies. 
 Therefore, it was decided to test for across-model (liberal democracies versus 
other regime types) interaction effects for all variables included in the analyses by re-
running the regression for the total sample and including the appropriate interaction 
terms. These analyses make it possible to calculate unstandardized slopes for liberal 
democracies and other regime types and to determine if the differences in these slopes are 
statistically significant. The results of the regression runs necessary to calculate these 
slopes are presented in Tables 6 and 7. In Table 6 ressentiment is regressed on the  
 
Table 6 
Regression Results for Ressentiment that Include Interaction Terms in Model 2 
(Total Sample, N=111) 
Independent 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 
Regime Type -2.500*** -5.102*** 
Political 
Inequality .004** .004 
Economic 
Inequality .050 -.017 
Political 
Inequality x 
Regime Type  -.095*** 
Economic 
Inequality x 
Regime Type  .082* 
Constant 4.838 7.663 
R² .473 .577 
              




independent variables in model 1 and on the independent variables plus two interaction 
terms (one for political-inequality-x-regime-type interaction and one for income-
inequality-x-regime-type interaction) in model 2. 
 Model 1 explains 47.3 percent of the variance in ressentiment, with regime type 
and economic inequality having significant effects. However, when the interaction terms 
are added (model 2), explained variance increases to 57.7 percent, meaning that taking 
the interaction effects into account explains an additional 10.4 percent of the variation in 
ressentiment. The political-inequality-x-regime-type interaction is significant at the .001 
level and the economic-inequality-x-regime-type interaction is significant at almost the 
.01 level (p=.014). 
 In other regime types, the unstandardized slope for the relationship between 
political inequality and ressentiment is essentially zero (.004), and the corresponding 
slope for liberal democracies is negative and strong (-.091)
3
. The difference in these 
slopes (-.095) is substantial, but the direction of the interaction effect (negative) is the 
opposite of what is implied by hypothesis 2. Political inequality was predicted to have a 
significantly stronger positive, not negative, effect on ressentiment. Hypothesis 4, which 
states that the relationship between economic inequality and ressentiment is stronger in 
liberal democracies than in other regime types, receives some support. In other regime 
types, the unstandardized slope for the relationship between economic inequality and 
ressentiment is -.017 and the corresponding slope for liberal democracies is .065. 
                                                 
 
3
 Since "other regime types" is coded zero, the effect of .004 for political inequality in model 2 is 
the unstandardized coefficient estimating the effect of political inequality on ressentiment in other regime 
types. To obtain unstandardized coefficients estimating the effects of political inequality on ressentiment in 
liberal democracies one simply adds the regime-type-x-political-inequality coefficient (-.095) to the 




Although economic inequality does not have the hypothesized positive effect among 
other regime types, it has a weak negative effect that, as noted earlier, is not statistically 
significant. In contrast, the corresponding slope for liberal democracies is positive and 
moderately strong. 
 In Table 7 terrorism is the dependent variable. Model 1 includes all the 
independent variables and ressentiment. Model 2 includes all of the variables in the first 
model and adds interaction terms to assess political-, economic-, and ressentiment-by-
regime-type interaction. Adding the interaction terms increases the explained variance 
(R²= .054 in model 1 and .112 in model 2). However, the findings do not support 
hypothesis 6, which predicts that the relationship between ressentiment and terrorism is 
more strongly positive among liberal democracies than other regime types. The 
ressentiment-by-regime-type interaction term is not significant, indicating that the 
relationships do not differ significantly from each other. 
 Only one of the three interaction terms is significant: regime type interacts with 
political inequality to influence terrorism. Among liberal democracies, the slope is 1.453 









Regression Results for Terrorism that Include Interaction Terms in Model 2 (Total 
Sample, N=111) 
Independent 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 
Regime Type -18.044 15.855 
Political 
Inequality -.119 -.152 
Economic 
Inequality .406 1.041 
Ressentiment -.885 2.667 
Political 
Inequality x 
Regime Type  1.605* 
Economic 
Inequality x 
Regime Type  -.828 
Ressentiment x 
Regime Type  -.910 
Constant 15.036 -35.825 
R² .054 .112 
           
     †p≤0.10, *p≤ 0.05, ** p≤ 0.01, ***p≤ 0.001 
 
Summary and Discussion 
 
 This paper brought evidence to bear on whether or not Nietzsche's ideas about 
ressentiment are helpful in understanding the relationship between inequality and 
terrorism. According to Nietzsche, inequality "causes" ressentiment, a hatred of the elite 
stemming from perceived wrong-doing, which, in turn, provides moral justification for 
violent action against the elite in the form of terrorism.  
 Hypotheses were tested which predict that political and economic inequality have 
positive effects on ressentiment and that ressentiment has a positive effect on terrorism. 
In addition, several hypotheses were tested which predict that these effects are stronger in 
liberal democracies than in other regime types. The stronger effects in liberal 
50 
 
democracies were expected because the ideology that supports liberal democracies 
creates expectations of equality and rejects the notion that some people are more 
deserving of power and privileges than others. As other regime types do not foster this 
idea and may in fact embrace inequality as an integral part of the social fabric, there is 
less of a basis for seeing inequality as a wrong-doing on behalf of the powerful. This does 
not mean ressentiment does not exist in other regime types, but rather that it will be less 
intense in those regimes.    
 Among other regime types, the inequality variables and ressentiment failed to 
have the hypothesized positive effects. As will be discussed in greater detail below, these 
findings may indicate that inequality is such an integral part of the social fabric in these 
regimes that it assumes a taken-for-granted reality that suppresses ressentiment to the 
point of being inconsequential. Nietzsche, who believed that the will to power was innate 
and not easily tamed by social norms, may have underestimated the degree to which 
being born into an established society and socialized to accept its customs and mores 
results in the politically and economically less fortunate accepting a subordinate position. 
Among liberal democracies, economic inequality had the hypothesized positive effect on 
ressentiment, and this effect, as hypothesized, was significantly stronger than the 
economic inequality effect for other regime types. This lends some credence to the idea 
that people who live in liberal democracies are more sensitized to issues of inequality 
than people who live under other regime types. However, none of the other hypotheses 
about liberal democracies were supported.  
 As only two of the six hypotheses were supported, the predictive utility of 
Nietzsche's theory is questionable. The positive relationship between economic inequality 
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and ressentiment in liberal democracies and the presence of a statistically significant 
interaction effect between economic inequality and regime type lend some credence to 
Nietzsche's proposed connection between liberal democracy and ressentiment. However, 
the fact that there was no relationship between ressentiment and terrorism in either model 
challenges the idea that ressentiment leads to anti-elite political violence. As the 
theorized relationship was not found, it is unclear and perhaps even unlikely that 
ressentiment poses a danger to the social order.  
 In addition to failing to support the hypotheses, the analyses yielded several other 
unexpected findings. First, in the liberal democracies, political inequality had a rather 
strong negative effect on ressentiment rather than the hypothesized positive effect. 
Moreover, this effect was significantly stronger in liberal democracies than in other 
regime types. Second, political inequality had a direct positive effect on terrorism that 
was substantial and unpredicted by the theory. While, in liberal democracies, political 
inequality had a negative relationship with ressentiment, economic inequality had the 
predicted positive relationship with ressentiment. These findings seem contradictory and 
warrant explanation. 
 The reason there is a negative relationship between political inequality and 
ressentiment in liberal democracies and no relationship between these two variables in 
other regime types may be due to socialization into a system's political norms. In 
authoritarian and democratizing countries, people may have no expectations of political 
representation in the government because they were not brought up in an environment 
that values those rights. Therefore, since it is taken for granted that the workings of the 
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government are removed from their lives, they do not feel aggrieved by not being able to 
participate in it.  
 By the same token, liberal democracies also socialize people to accept their 
political values. Since policies, in theory, ultimately are controlled by the will of the 
people, the public in liberal democracies may be much more willing to trust politicians 
and political elites than people in other regime types would.  Mechanisms of exclusion 
may carry legitimacy in liberal democracies because of this public trust. If laws that 
exclude are to be accepted, they must carry some rationale that it is in the best interest of 
the state and the people as a whole. Some research into public opinion concludes that in 
liberal democracies, elite opinion has more effect on the beliefs of the general public than 
the public does on the positions of the elites (Zaller 1992; Jacobs and Shapiro 2000). 
Thus, the public may be more willing to accept that laws that favor exclusion as 
necessary if politicians argue that they are for the public good. People will believe these 
policy rationalizations because they generally trust the political elite to do the right thing 
for the nation.  
 If the norms in liberal democracies justify political inequality, that is not the case 
for economic inequality. Economic inequality may be positively related to ressentiment 
because, while people may be able to comfortably live without political equality, it is 
harder to accept bad economic outcomes, as this directly affects most people's quality of 
life. Since the political system promotes the idea that public policy should reflect the will 
of the people as a core value, people may feel aggrieved by growing economic inequality 
as the policies that uphold the economic system are not working in their favor. In 
essence, expectations of social and political equality may bleed over into the economic 
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sphere, giving citizens the sense that they should enjoy some decent standard of living if 
not total economic equality. Other regime types lack a political or social basis for 
equality, so the people that live in them may not feel that they deserve economic equality 
either.  
 According to Lipset (1981), even in democratic systems, people low in the status 
and economic hierarchy tend to exhibit greater anti-democratic and authoritarian 
tendencies than those who are from a higher class. Thus in times of economic 
precariousness and growing economic inequality, when the ranks of the lower classes 
start to swell, people may still retain faith in the system if some political faction tries to 
exclude others, who they brand as dangerous elements, from the political process. If 
politicians pick targets for exclusion that have pre-existing social prejudice directed 
against them, this may suppress ressentiment. The public may perceive appeals for 
exclusion as evidence of democratic responsiveness and the government looking out for 
their interests rather than as a threat to their collective freedom.  
 The direct positive effect of political inequality on terrorism in the liberal 
democracies also seems to contradict its negative effect on ressentiment. This study 
assumes that the terrorism that springs from ressentiment will be directed towards the 
nation that created it rather than that ressentiment will provoke violence against 
convenient targets. This means that it can only account for domestic terrorism. Although 
most terrorist attacks are likely home grown, the data did not allow for distinctions 
between domestic and transnational terrorism, as there is no master list of transnational 
terrorist organizations and many incidents in the GTD were carried out by unknown 
perpetrators. Therefore, this finding may reflect that liberal democracies with relatively 
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high levels of political inequality are the preferred targets of transnational terrorists. 
While excluded groups in liberal democracies accept their status, outsiders that are 
motivated by a cause may not. Therefore, transnational terrorists may integrate the plight 
of the excluded groups as part of their own grievances.  
 There may be other factors related to regime type that have a greater effect on 
terrorism than economic and political inequality. Ongoing civil conflict between ethnic 
and religious groups may cause an increase in terrorist activity. If governments cannot 
stop the fighting, more people may enter the conflict because of the perceived need for 
self-defense rather than whatever issues originally sparked the conflict. Groups may use 
terrorism as a tactic against their enemies. The research relating to civil conflict indicates 
that this more likely to affect democratizing countries than liberal democracies or 
authoritarian states (Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, and Gleditsch 2001). 
 In most societies, prejudice exists that favors certain kinds of social traits such as 
race, gender, and religion. Over time these sentiments can relax, and the groups that 
benefited from possessing favored traits may no longer feel like they are getting the same 
benefits, be they tangible or intangible rewards. People with the favored traits may not 
receive any material benefits from having them, but may feel a disappearing sense of 
pride when the idea that they are the right kind of person is no longer as strongly 
reinforced. Declining social status may spur members of a formerly dominant group to 
engage in acts of terrorism. This is more likely to cause terrorism in liberal democracies 
than other regimes, because in other regime types the dominant group would have an 
easier time using the power of the state to uphold and officially sanction their dominant 
status. Thus, when people in liberal democracies do not feel like they are being paid the 
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appropriate social honor, they can engage in terrorism in an attempt to force the state to 
comply with their demands. Terrorism has the secondary effect of intimidating people so 
that they change their behavior in the ways that comply with the terrorists' goals. For 
example, fear of reprisal might compel people to maintain informal social exclusion of 
some groups, such as cutting off their access to well paying jobs, when they would 
otherwise have no interest in doing so.   
 The study has some important limitations. It is based on data from 2008, only a 
single year of terrorist activity. Before, drawing firm conclusions about the usefulness, or 
lack thereof, of Nietzsche's ideas, the analyses should be repeated using data from several 
years. It is also limited by its sample size. Using the nation-state as the unit of analysis 
and the difficulty of finding cross-national data for all countries in the world restricted the 
sample size. In the current study, two of the categories of regime type, partial 
democracies and authoritarian regimes, had to be collapsed to create a single category 
that was large enough to allow for data analyses. Clumping these two types of countries 
together may conceal important differences between them. 
 The Corruption Perceptions Index is a less than ideal measure of ressentiment. It 
relies on the opinions of outside observers and the business elite of each country to gauge 
the general consensus on how corrupt the government is. It does correlate well with other 
surveys that do measure public opinion, indicating that there is a fair amount of 
agreement between groups concerning a country's level of corruption. Nevertheless, a 
survey that polled the general population of the country would be a better measure, 
especially if it included questions that tried to discover if perceived corruption is 
associated with strong feelings of hostility towards the government. Perceptions of 
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corruption may not automatically translate into intense anti-elite sentiments as it may be 
possible for people to begrudgingly accept elite misdeeds as the way things are.  
 Despite these limitations, this study has added to the empirical literature 
concerning the ties between inequality, regime type, and terrorism. It is also novel in that 
it used a theorist, Nietzsche, that has been largely overlooked by sociologists as a 
theoretical guide and derived testable hypotheses from his writings. Future research 
should continue to explore the relationship between political inequality and terrorism in 
liberal democracies. In addition to trying to overcome the short-comings of this study, 
further refinement of the Exclusion Index may be necessary, so that it includes the people 
who are enfranchised by law but disenfranchised by practice. It would be ideal for future 
research to find some way to filter out or control for types of terrorism that the current 
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Appendix A: Path Analysis Model of Total Sample 
 
 The table below shows the decomposition of effects for a model that uses the total 
sample. The effects of political inequality and economic inequality on ressentiment are 
positive, but only the effect of economic inequality is statistically significant. The direct 
effect of regime type on ressentiment is negative and significant at the .001 level. 
Ressentiment is much lower in liberal democracies. None of the variables has a 
statistically significant total or direct effect on terrorism. 
 
Table 8 





Variable Total Effects 
Indirect 
Effects Direct Effects 
Ressentiment Political   
Inequality .062  .062 
 Economic 
Inequality .220**  .220** 
 Regime Type -.568***  -.568*** 
 R²   .473 
Terrorism Political 
Inequality -.107 -.003 -.104 
 Economic 
Inequality .880 -.010 .098 
 Regime Type -.197† .028 -.225† 
 Ressentiment -.049  -.049 
 R²   .054 
 
†p≤0.10, *p≤ 0.05, **p≤ 0.01, ***p≤ 0.001 
 
 Figure 5 presents the standardized and unstandardized path coefficients for the 















   †p≤0.10,*p≤ 0.05, **p≤ 0.01, ***p≤ 0.001 
Figure 5 





























between economic inequality and ressentiment, and a very strong (-.568) negative  
relationship between regime type and ressentiment. No other relationship between 
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